TY - JOUR
T1 - An experimental test of two policies to increase donations to public projects
AU - Ramirez Zamudio, Aldo Fabricio
AU - López Pérez, Raúl
N1 - Funding Information:
We are grateful to Gibr?n Cruz-Mart?nez and participants at the First International Congress in Behavioral Economics and Finance at the University of Lima in November 2018 for helpful comments and suggestions. We also gratefully acknowledge financial support from Instituto de Investigaci?n Cient?fica IDIC at the University of Lima and helpful research assistance by Deyvi Abanto and Christie Awa also at the University of Lima.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2020 Elsevier Inc.
PY - 2020/6/1
Y1 - 2020/6/1
N2 - This paper uses lab-in-the-field experiments and theory to explore why people give money to gov-ernments. We assume that giving is motivated by outcome–oriented or consequentialist norms, andconditional on (a) others’ behavior and (b) beliefs about how competent the government is. The evidencefrom a lab experiment in Peru is in line with this. On the other hand, we analyze the potential effectsof two policies to increase giving, observing that less people give zero if they are informed about (i)two specific government projects (a subway line and a children’s hospital) or (ii) that some well-knownOlympic medalist pays punctually her taxes, according to public information released by the Peruviantax Agency. Our findings contribute to a burgeoning literature on tax morale and are arguably relevantto understand taxpayers’ non-selfish reasons to pay (or evade) their taxes.
AB - This paper uses lab-in-the-field experiments and theory to explore why people give money to gov-ernments. We assume that giving is motivated by outcome–oriented or consequentialist norms, andconditional on (a) others’ behavior and (b) beliefs about how competent the government is. The evidencefrom a lab experiment in Peru is in line with this. On the other hand, we analyze the potential effectsof two policies to increase giving, observing that less people give zero if they are informed about (i)two specific government projects (a subway line and a children’s hospital) or (ii) that some well-knownOlympic medalist pays punctually her taxes, according to public information released by the Peruviantax Agency. Our findings contribute to a burgeoning literature on tax morale and are arguably relevantto understand taxpayers’ non-selfish reasons to pay (or evade) their taxes.
KW - Donations
KW - Peer effects
KW - Public projects
KW - Social norms
KW - Tax morale
UR - https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12724/10184
UR - https://www.scopus.com/pages/publications/85079146447
UR - https://www.mendeley.com/catalogue/aea0eda3-5ac1-3507-a23f-7bd6f0985393/
U2 - 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105892
DO - 10.1016/j.irle.2020.105892
M3 - Artículo (Contribución a Revista)
SN - 0144-8188
VL - 62
JO - International Review of Law and Economics
JF - International Review of Law and Economics
M1 - 105892
ER -